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The Obsolescence of Bureaucracy 
Alexander J. Matejko 
The bureaucratie model becomes more and more self-
defeating in présent time because it is highly inadéquate to meet 
the challenges of the modem world. Literature on the alternative 
models of collective work is now available. Thèse are also several 
highly encouraging practical expériences. Fewer and fewer people 
still trust that any substitute for bureaucracy is just unrealistic. 
Bureaucracy1 rests on command in the allocation of scarce resources 
and therefore should be treated as political in its true nature — opposed to 
the allocation based on customs or exchange contracts (Easton, 1965). The 
distinction between friend and foe, Us and the Other (Schmitt, 1963) is 
therefore the backbone of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy controls the scarce 
resources and in this capacity is vulnérable to external and internai danger. 
At the same time bureaucracy itself may artificially manipulate scarcity for 
its own benefit and become dangerous to its own surroundings. This power 
of bureaucracy dépends on the ability to countervail the rival socio-political 
forces as well as to achieve internai cohesiveness. 
It is an open question as to how much bureaucratization is able to harm 
complex organizations by depleting their storage of energy, slowing down 
their organizational growth, undermining organizational endurance and 
survival, and diminishing the organizational control of the surrounding en-
vironment. Obviously, bureaucracies are strongly oriented towards survival 
and the satisfaction of the suprême disposer but place less emphasis on the 
long term maximization of organizational returns. "The organization shall 
not incapacitate its environment as a source of inputs and a receiver of out-
puts, since doing so would reduce its own effectiveness or even its power to 
* MATEJKO, Alexander J., Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Alber-
ta. 
î According to Marx, there are at least four différent meanings of the word 
"bureaucracy": a) civil service, b) the indiffèrent treatment of clients by administrators, c) the 
growth of the executive sector over and above the législative sector, d) the domination exercis-
ed by the administrative power élite. He also made a distinction between the four types of 
bureaucracy based on guardianship, caste, patronage and merit (Marx, 1957:20-21 and chapter 
four). 
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survive. Maximization to that seemingly self-destructive point is by no 
means uncommon..." (Katz and Kahn, 1978:251). Bureaucracies deplete 
their environments by reducing their functionaries to mediocrities (Mate-
jko, 1979), creating a widespread anomie, forcing people to take a défensive 
attitude, splitting human relations according to organizational Unes, 
spreading impersonality and anonimity, imposing the procédural approach 
to ail problems, idolizing the institution over and above the human good, 
enforcing rigidity, and substituting sincère commitment for goal fulfillment 
by the pretentious manipulation of facts, materials and human beings. 
It is in the nature of bureaucracy that it naturally drives in its 
endeavours beyond an optimum and stimulâtes countervailing forces. The 
process of task specialization entirely neglects the utmost importance of 
socio-moral bonds which energize individuals, allow them to find the com-
mon understanding, provide stability and predictability, and assure some 
minimum of mental health. Standardization of rôle performance frac-
tionates human responsibility, endangers the internai cohésion and identity 
of individuals and groups as natural elementary parts of social Systems, and 
créâtes the illusion of "order", "rationality" and "coordination" in which 
the social factors are omitted. 
In bureaucracies unity of command and centralization of décision 
making are based on a very simplified and one-sided understanding of the 
nature of power — power free from moral responsibility, oriented towards 
manipulation, reduced mostly to coercion, sanctified by the priority of in-
stitutional good over the good of human communities. The whole concept 
of community as the source of such power is foreign to bureaucracy in 
which its suprême disposer is reduced to something anonymous and 
therefore free from any ultimate responsibility. The dilution of responsibili-
ty between various steps in the bureaucratie hierarchy makes the latter fac-
tor particularly harmful to the human community. 
Uniformity of practices within the bureaucratie organizations is the 
major source of ossification and conservatism. Following mainly "the sur-
vival model" bureaucracies show a great hesitancy to accept any novelties 
which would upset the well established order. The vested interests of 
bureaucratie functionaries located at various hierarchical levels prevent new 
ideas and the people behind them from being introduced successfully into 
the organizational reality. Bureaucracies are more willing to accept 
counterfeit innovations rather than genuine innovations because the former 
are much easier to digest; especially if the pseudo-innovators and the en-
trenched bureaucrats share some common interests. 
No duplication of functions is allowed in bureaucracies but this princi-
ple is combined with the élimination of opinion différences, questioning, 
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opposition, and right of dissent. Bureaucraties are not designed to accept 
dissent and disagreement as a source of progress and creativity. There is a 
strong tendency to localize, "pacify" and eventually eliminate any sources 
of potential disagreement. In the sélection of personnel spécial attention is 
paid to the rejection of possible "troublemakers" who may contaminate the 
supposedly prevailing spirit of peace and agreement. The anti-dialectical 
nature of bureaucracies is one of the major sources of their self-defeat. 
Bureaucratie personnel are supposed to be rewarded for merit but this 
is interpreted mainly as disposability and institutional loyalty. The well-
being of the bureaucratie organization itself is the ultimate institutional goal 
and the latent function of self-preservation and self-aggrandizement 
dominâtes over the manifest goals formulated and reformulated for the 
sake of good public relations. Under such circumstances the employées who 
really deserve merit are those who contribute to the good of the bureaucracy 
and not those who are committed to other goals of a professional, social or 
moral nature. The graduai élimination of those who do not share the total 
bureaucratie commitment, are not willing to serve the hierarchy and accept 
the stéréotype of an "organization man" (Whyte, 1956) is the 
"triumphant" bureaucracies. 
Depersonalization of the office was a great organizational achievement 
in the historical beginnings of the bureaucratie form when it took over from 
the arrangements totally immersed in the tribal, familial and privatized 
frameworks. It was necessary once to make a clear différence between the 
"private" and the "institutional'' sphères, especially as long as the division 
of labour remained underdeveloped. The problem is that bureaucracy in-
stead of fulfilling its historical function and timely withdrawing from the 
historical scène in order to provide a place for the higher forms of work 
organization, more adéquate to the sophisticated level of socio-economic 
development, has survived and has become a suitable organizational 
weapon for power and the success of those who gain from bureaucracy. 
One of the very important reasons that this above mentioned perpétration 
could happen is the ideological neutrality of bureaucracy as a machine 
disposable to anybody who is powerful enough to take it over and 
sophisticated enough to use it for his own benefit. In this machine the 
ultimate values are pushed aside; therefore it is easy to switch from one 
ideological programme to another without effecting much change in the 
machine. Even the change of personnel may be achieved very smoothly by 
the application of appropriate sélections and training devices. 
Depersonalization has several side effects which are disastrous for 
bureaucracies in the long run. In this dehumanized world of bureaucracy 
human well-being has to be constantly neglected, work motivation does not 
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crystalize, loyalties are superficial and ephemeral, responsibility to the ex-
ternal world becomes subordinated to the vested interests of the institution 
and its disposers. The growth of formalization thwarts the natural develop-
ment of informai relationships: organization becomes distorted, uncon-
trolable and dominated by private coalitions harmful to the institution. Cli-
ques paly a major rôle even if they do not appear on any organizational 
blueprint. Privatization flourishes unhampered within the formalized 
organizational environment which is supposed to eliminate completely any 
personalization. 
The basic assumptions in the bureaucratie model often become 
counter-productive not necessarily because they are wrong when taken in-
dividually but because their peculiar combination reinforces the gap bet-
ween the organizational model and the socio-moral reality, as well as expos-
ing the artificial character of this model. This is not the natural human en-
vironment open to spontaneity, creativity and dispute but a machine 
suitable for the skillful manipulation by those who are willing and able to 
take full advantage of the fact that there is enough of a gap and inconsisten-
cy between various assumptions. The bureaucratie weapon estranges itself 
easily from the control by a society weakened in its moral unity, open to 
divergent interprétations, and confused by its own complexity. In the past 
the rulers exercised a strong hand over the still weakly developed 
bureaucracies: now the "overdeveloped" bureaucracies dominate over the 
socially and spiritually weakened societies emptied of their moral fiber and 
traditional roots. The control of bureaucracies from outside has become 
sporadic, superficial, highly inadéquate, dispirited, with no adéquate feed-
back. Those who are closest to the centres of bureaucratie power hâve ail 
the advantages available to them and can easily do what they wish. 
The bureaucratie model becomes more and more self-defeating in pré-
sent times because it is highly inadéquate to meet the challenges of the 
modem world. It does not fit into the rapid change. It does not: mobilize 
higher motivation and human willingness to cooperate. It does not pay at-
tention to the needs and anguishes of modem people. It is not able to con-
siderably improve its efficiency. It does not improve human relations. It 
does not give any hope for the solving of the crucial socio-economic and 
political problems of our times. 
Literature on the alternative models of collective work is now 
available. There are also several highly encouraging practical expériences 
(Matejko, 1979). Fewer and fewer people still trust that any substitute for 
bureaucracy is just unrealistic. The question remains as to what will move 
faster: the self-defeating trend of bureaucracy down the drain or the thriv-
ing of the administrative révolution (Berkley, 1971). The "calculable rules" 
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on which the bureaucratie mechanisms dépend lose in importance in a Socie-
ty which gains its organic solidarity (Durkheim) from the far reaching 
modem division of labour which is calculative by itself. Dilettantism has 
ceased to be a major danger under conditions of a uni versai éducation and 
professionalism. Legality is already realtively well assured in developed 
societies which show, in gênerai, a much higher level of external and inter-
nai stability than in traditional agrarian societies (Lenski and Lenski, 1978). 
Formalization could be a progressive trend in the pre-industrial societies 
which suffered from too much intimacy. However, at the higher stages of 
socio-economical development it becomes a nuisance. Neutrality stops be-
ing an asset in modem times when bureaucracies hâve become the dominant 
form of work organization. In a dynamic society there is no room for the in-
stitutional structures based on longevity of their personnel, promoting delay 
and inflexibility. 
There is a growing need for new forms of work organization which 
would allow the application of discretionary measures geared in every in-
stance to the changing task exigencies. Of course, there is always a danger 
that without the objective, non-arbitrary application of calculable norms, 
the situation may lead to the unequal treatment of individuals and their 
cases, favoritism, and préférence. However, with the progressing diver-
sification of tasks, changing ratio of staff to line personnel, the improve-
ment of communication up the line, transformation of authority relation-
ships, decentralization and gênerai relaxation of rules hâve become a 
necessity which makes the bureaucratie pyramid obsolète. We do not hâve 
enough time to waste on procédural considération because time becomes 
too precious. The span of time from discovery of a new technology to its 
practical application is constantly decreasing (Dorf, 1974:14). When the 
routine and répétitive tasks diminish in importance than there is more need 
for new organizational forms based on an easy cross-communication, high 
level of job discrétion, team work, intrinsic motivation, management by ob-
jectives, etc. The mounting need for innovation "places priority on men 
and women who can think for themselves and frowns on those who 
slavishly seek to imitate their peers and superiors. It requires organizations 
to blink at or even welcome human eccentricities when such features are 
part of a human being's package of potentialities. It forces organization to 
emphasize internai coopération and discourage competitiveness. For in-
novation in the complex technology of today requires team work" (Berkley, 
1971:69-70). 
Bureaucracies are able to flourish in the condition of relative isolation 
and domination over countervailing forces. The unorganized clientèle 
unable to exercise any control and pressure; lack of other organizational 
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forces able to compete effectively by offering the same or even better ser-
vices at a lower rate; the passive environment unable to react against abuses 
practiced by bureaucracy; an effective résistance to the challenge offered by 
new perspectives; the concentration of full power within one's own ranks 
and the rejection of any input by outsiders; professionals kept at a distance; 
the effective prévention of personnel being exposed to any novelties; mutual 
loyalties among bureaucrats used to dominate over the forces of dissention; 
the continuous recruitment of loyalistic candidates free from any broad ex-
ternal commitments; the ability to apply unidimensional procédures and ap-
proaches to current tasks — ail thèse factors allow bureaucracies to func-
tion on the basis of a semi-closed System and therefore remain relatively 
autonomous. 
However, in the modem world there are more and more trends which 
undermine thèse factors. Clients organize themselves and exercise pressures 
more or less effectively, for example, R. Nader and his consumer defence 
movement. The vigorous entrepreneurial spirit créâtes various enterprises 
which prove to be more successful than the ossified bureaucracies, for ex-
ample, the private post delivery agencies competing with the governmental 
postal services in North America. With the growing surplus of collective 
consciousness in the sophisticated developed societies (R. Bahro, 1979) the 
external social environment of bureaucracies is becoming more and more 
sensitive to the maldoings of bureaucracies. It is very significant that the 
public condemnation of bureaucracies is expressed more and more by peo-
ple who used to be their obedient servants, from the CIA and KGB agents, 
through various civil servants to even the Roman Catholic priests. 
Organizational conformism is widely denounced in the popular literature 
and the stéréotype of an "organization man" has clearly négative connota-
tions. 
Bureaucracies, whether they wish to or not, hâve to open themselves to 
new horizons, hire consultants, pay attention to strangers, dépend on pro-
fessional personnel with strong external attachments, and introduce some 
innovations. However, a large part of thèse endeavours are just "window-
dressing". Professional consultants are hired but their reports remain idle 
in files; innovations are widely publicized for the sake of public relations 
and afterward they are discontinued. The conservative résistance against 
any deeper reforms is one of the characteristics of bureaucracies; the deep 
root of it is the inhérent feeling of insecurity among the bureaucratie func-
tionaries who owe everything to their institution and are helpless without its 
sponsorship. With the growing rôle of professionals in bureaucracies this 
feeling of insecurity is being substituted by the feeling of misplacement and 
aliénation among people who entered bureaucracies with the trust in their 
own éducation background, and ambition to achieve in their lives 
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something valid professionally, and the disinclination to be conformistic. 
Therefore, bureaucracies are exposed to growing internai tensions, especial-
ly in the public bureaucracies when the tenure of a civil servant position and 
unionization défend employées quite effectively against the interorganiza-
tional pressures. 
Bureaucracies pay great attention to «esprit de corps» but this is done 
in an isolationistic manner. The "crystal palace'' of a big corporation or of 
a state apparatus may be comfortable to the insiders but totally lukewarm 
to outsiders. "The fact that the individual is serving some group which is 
greater than himself blinds him to the fact that his group is only a part of 
the whole" (Boulding, 1953). In the bureaucracies this tendency is reinforc-
ed by the vested interests of the administrative élite which become easily 
divorced from social interests. "The bureaucratie landscape is dotted with 
agencies which no longer serve any useful purpose and which may even 
frustrate the attainment of society's purposes. Yet such agencies can often 
cling to life with a formidable tenacity when confronted by possible extinc-
tion" (Berkley, 1971:147). Vested institutional interests lead to a high level 
of defensiveness or even aggresiveness; members of a given complex 
organization protect one another against any external scrutiny; external ef-
forts to introduce some controls are sabotaged successfully by ail levels of 
the bureaucratie hierarchy; coverups are a common occurrence of 
bureaucratie life. At the same time there are intense rivalries and 
animosities inside bureaucracies behind the façade of the solidarity versus 
the outside world. Bureaucrats within their own ranks are divided according 
to organizational boundaries, unit loyalties, suppressed ambitions and Per-
sonal animosities. The pseudorationalistic character of bureaucracies 
prevents them quite effectively from achieving any deeper internai solidarity 
as well as an adéquate efficiency. "Resources are wasted, énergies are 
sacrificed, and efforts are sabotaged. Thus, because of the isolation which it 
fosters, and because this isolation tends to build up internai pressures, the 
overtly cohesive organization is not only not ail that cohesive but it is also 
not ail that efficient" (Berkley, 1971:149). 
In the modem multidimensional world the bureaucratie endeavour to 
reduce everything to unidimensionality becomes more and more difficult 
because of the growing complexity of problems faced by bureaucracies, the 
growing educational level of people, the lack of imagination among 
bureaucrats, neglect of the intelligence function, and compétition between 
various bureaucracies. According to Marcuse, "The more rational, produc-
tive, technical, and total the répressive administration of society becomes, 
the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered in-
dividuals might their servitude and seize their own libération" (Marcuse, 
1964:6-7). He treats an effective suffocation of libération needs as the 
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distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society. The pessimistic image 
of a bureaucratized society offered by Marcuse is far from social reality 
because his image of freedom is unreal. He claims that "self-détermination 
will be real to the extent to which the masses hâve been dissolved into in-
dividuals liberated from ail propaganda, indoctrination, and manipulation, 
capable of knowing and comprehending the facts and of evaluating the 
alternatives" (Marcuse, 1964:252). Liberation from unidimensionality does 
not necessarily mean achievement of a mythologized absolute freedom from 
any social influences, which are unavoidable, but the résistance of people 
against the manipulation of them into the rôle of passive objects of the 
bureaucratie authority everywhere — under capitalism as well as under any 
kind of socialism. 
The unidimensional reductionism of human beings under bureaucracy 
originates from the systemic nature of the bureaucractic model based on the 
rationalistic intellectual tradition, highly appealing to administrators and 
technicians. There is some truth in the claim of R. Lilienfeld that Systems 
theory has become the ideology of the administrative intellectual. "The 
ideology of Systems theory could be said to consist of having no ideology, in 
the popular sensé of a spécifie political commitment. Like the dialectic, it 
provides a vocabulary that permits its predictiveness to celebrate and serve 
whatever social developments émerge over the horizon. It can be both con-
servative and revolutionary at the same time, perhaps in the same sensé in 
which Marxian dialecticians are conservative with respect to their own 
societies and revolutionary with respect to others (...). System, theory as 
social doctrine may be regarded as a variant of organic or 'organismic' ap-
proaches to society." (Lilienfeld, 1978:263). 
The image of bureaucracy as a more or less cohérent System plays a 
very important socio-political rôle because it provides a myth of a suprême 
organizational being, an object of service and idolatry. The power ac-
cumulated in bureaucracies provides the reinforcement for this myth and 
makes it even more appealing. The présent organizational complexity and 
the high level technology on one side and utilitarianism, practicism and the 
ideology crisis on the other side, make the above mentioned myth par-
ticularly suitable. "It is at such a time that the notion of society run by im-
partial benevolent technicians operating on the basis of actual logic and im-
personal algorithmic methods could corne to the fore as a new ideology (or 
nonideology), and in fact one that appears attractive to ail advanced in-
dustrial societies regardless of their officiai eighteenth- or nineteenth-
century creeds" (Lilienfeld, 1978:264). 
This "nonideology" is well suited to the professional and semi-
professional cadres of the welfare state agencies, the giant corporate enter-
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prises, military institutions, etc. The system effectiveness provides a ra-
tionale for various groups of bureaucrats who badly need a scientific 
mystification in order to increase the justification of their actions directly to 
the public and to legitimize bureaucratie interventions that might otherwise 
be resisted (Moynihan, 1973; Krause, 1968). In this manner the bureaucratie 
élite imposes itself as the only problem-solver recognized and selected on ac-
count of its spécial capabilities. The élément of mystification is reinforced 
by the widespread utilization of experts who are recognized as long as ithey 
play the rôle of the obedient servants of power (Barritz, 1965). In the U.S. 
there has been a growth of the government by contract and grant; the ratio 
of fédéral employées per one thousand population has diminished in the 
period 1956-1976 from 14 to 13, but now almost 80,000 full time govern-
ment employées administer around $110 billion given as contracts and 
grants (1973 data). According to R. Nader, "fortified by personal relation-
ships and contracts, the consulting industry services the needs of public and 
private institutions in spécifie and by now routine ways. Fédéral department 
officiais achieve significant insulation from criticism of their behavior if 
they can cite a "think tank" study. The imprimatur of consulting firms, 
sympathetic to and associated with the largest business interests in the land, 
conveys, to an inquiring congressional committee for example, that a 
department's action has the backing of an industrial or commercial 
establishment. Obviously, developing or recommending the types of 
Government programs which enrich corporate interests, in turn, ingratiates 
the consulting firms with the business part of the triangle. A combination of 
the abdication of tis responsibilities by the Executive Branch and the asser-
tiveness of the firms themselves insinuâtes them solidly into the governmen-
tal process" (Guttman and Willner, 1976:XI-XII). 
DURABILITY AND FRAGILITY 
Complex organizations, due to their contrived nature, are potentially 
durable but at the same time they are highly fragile. The cernent which 
keeps them intact consists of the interrelated rôles and the individuals2 who 
2 The personalities are very important in the case of a charismatic authority and 
therefore the latter is an unstable basis of organization but very functional in the community 
framework. Caplov defines an organization as a social system thah has an unequivocal collec-
tive identity, an exact roster of members, a programme of activity and procédures. According 
to Max Weber, whether or not an organization exists is a matter of the présence of a person in 
authority. 
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occupy them. With progressing standardization, formalization and 
mechanization of thèse rôles there is a growing probability of a gap between 
the rôle and the human being who fills it. The perceptions of officiai and 
semi-official rôles by people probably differ in modem times much more 
from the organizational programs than was the case in the more traditional 
civilizations, particularly those of a non-pluralistic nature. Individuals are 
more exposed to a whole variety of différent values; the socialization 
mechanisms are less reliable; societies dépend much more on mutual human 
interdependencies dictated by the developed division of labor than on in-
doctrination. (Even under communism practiced in the relatively advanced 
societies indoctrination is not treated seriously as the major factor of 
socialization.) Within the modem framework quite often there are some 
basic disagreements between the role-sending and the role-taking (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978: 191-197); the legitimacy of authority is shaky and ques-
tionable; the informai rôle practice differs widely from the prescribed for-
mal rôles; allocation of différent values within the organizational space 
prevents the development of a unified organizational culture; communica-
tion suffers from misunderstanding and willful distortions; pressures arise 
from strong résistant counter-pressures and the partial social intégration 
negatively oriented; the intrinsic satisfactions related to rôle performance 
do not cumulate for the benefit of the whole complex organization; the oc-
cupational and organizational self-identities of the organization members 
do not contribute to role-readiness. 
Formalization as the organizational technique of prescribing how, 
when, and by whom tasks are to be performed is a necessity but at the same 
time it leads to several dysfunctions. First of ail there is an incompatibility 
between any formai structure designed to achieve limited économie goals 
and the expression of potentialities of those who work within it. Secondly, 
the administrative component tends to decrease in size as organizational size 
increases, but in very large organizations, the relative size of the ad-
ministrative component again increases - although not up to the level that it 
assumes in small organizations. Thirdly, the administrative élément in large 
organizations is not substantially affected by opérations technology and 
therefore it may grow beyond its reasonable limits. Fourthly, organizations 
with routine work are more likely to hâve greater formalization of organiza-
tional rôles. Fifthly, organizations which employ professionals are less for-
malized than organizations without professionals. For professionals, the 
greater the degree of formalization in the organization the greater the 
likelihood of aliénation from work. 
It is an open question, to what extent modem complex organizations 
reduce human beings to mediocrities or déviants. The pressures to which 
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people are exposed within a highly bureaucratized environment can be 
resisted by them only up to a certain level and afterwards people just give 
up. It is impossible to say how much bureaucratie positions tend to attract 
people who are already suited to them, and how much bureaucracies just 
produce bureaucrats. Obviously, the mechanism of mutual reinforcement 
must be involved hère. People bring to bureaucracies their own idiosyn-
cracies and influence the organizational climate with them. On the other 
hand, the mental and moral horizons of individuals are shaped to a great ex-
tent by the organizational values and norms. 
Each of the organizational subsystems develops its own dynamic 
tendencies: production subsystem - technical proficiency, maintenance 
subsystem - stability and predictability, boundary and adaptive subsystems 
-- external and internai change, managerial subsystem ~ compromise, con-
trol, and survival. Thèse tendencies quite often are in conflict with each 
other when any subsystem contributes to disintegration and change instead 
of contributing to intégration and stability. The differentials in the hierar-
chical gradients of power, prestige and reward between various subsystems 
and the individuals behind them may become an object of strong compéti-
tion, especially when surplus margin is not big enough to allow for 
organizational growth and the "limited good" has to be given to one sub-
system at the expense of he remaining subsystems. 
From the technological perspective organizational structures are 
predetermined by the technology used. Variations in the organizational 
structures are closely linked with the différences in techniques applied. 
Organizations are defined from this perspective as Systems which utilize 
energy in a patterened, directed effort to alter the condition of basic 
materials in a predetermined manner. The organizational structure is largely 
constrained by the technology used. However, the variables of opérations 
technology are in reality related only to those structural variables that are 
centered on the workflow. Size appears as more important than technology 
in determining structure. From the sociological perspective it is important 
that the technology applied within organizations molds the type of social 
ties that envolve and allows the prédiction to some extent of the stratégies 
applied by various occupational groups in pursuit of their spécifie goals. 
Complexity in organizations takes the form of horizontal and vertical 
differentiation, as well as spatial dispersion. Their members are integrated 
mainly by reciprocal relationships which are focused on role-requirements 
that govern the behavior of those members. The task System opérâtes direct-
ly upon the socio-emotional (sentient) system which dérives from the per-
sonality needs motivating the human participants. A very strict régulation 
of rôles within organizations leads to the ossification of the whole organiza-
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tional structure. Over adhérence to and identification with organizational 
means can deflect the individual from the behavior that is most bénéficiai to 
the organization (bureaupathology). 
Organizational complexity in organizations is additionally complicated 
by the fact that it is neither true that organizations are always goal-seeking 
entities (the survival concerns in many cases are closer to reality than the ef-
ficiency concerns), nor that officiai goals are necessarily in agreement with 
the operative goals. The manifest organizational functions usually differ 
from the latent functions. There is a considérable amount of normative in-
compatibility in organizations resulting from inconsistency, dissensus, am-
biguity or overload. Internai states and processes in complex organizations 
are quite often inconsistent with the external demands and considerably 
lower in their adaptational capabilities. Différent parts of an organization 
hâve différent powers of coping with uncertainty and on this basis the in-
terests may diverge. A common value-orientation among the organizational 
members is of varying importance under various circumstances. Organiza-
tions most commonly adapt themselves to the changing environment by 
manipulating their own structures. Organizations characterized by high cen-
tralization of authority, formalization of rules, and stratification of reward 
structures are less likely to adopt innovations. 
The vulnerability of organizations to ossification dépends, among 
other things, on the type of organization. The quest for stable routines and 
secure statuses which pushes administrators to introduce bureaucracy 
(Weber) will be stronger in those organizations which are focused on the 
maintenance function than in those focused on the économie, adaptive or 
managerial function (the typology of Katz and Kahn, 1978). The principle 
of collegiality when applied to organizations weakens substantially the strict 
application of bureaucratie principles. Organizations supported by users, 
members or donors will probably be less bureaucratie than organizations 
supported by the gênerai public or by endowment.3 The exertion of authori-
ty as the dominant organizational factor of stratégie importance makes the 
organization more vulnérable to ossification than the opposition of 
économie interests. Organizations modeled on the machine theory may 
become more easily ossified than organizations in which the shared values 
of members and the group parameters of task interdependence play a major 
rôle. The larger and the more complex the organizations, the greater will be 
the similarity of several managerial parameters but also the greater the stan-
3 Endowment is defined as the légal right to enjoy current revenues derived from past ac-
cumulations of wealth. 
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dardization and the possibility of ossification. In organizations the degree 
of complexity has a direct relationship with formalization; size is the major 
predictor of decentralization (Child, 1973). With the growth in organiza-
tional size there is relatively less need for administrators, but at the same 
time communication becomes a paramount issue (Kasarda, 1974). The cost 
of differentiation is increased coordination. Disproportionate changes in 
subsystems resuit in the disproportionate increase in the administrative 
component of the organization. In gênerai, the relative size of the ad-
ministrative component in organizations dépends on the following seven 
main factors: accessibility to technological advances, the nature of the 
essential throughput, marginal productivity of added administrative per-
sonnel, homogeneity of the organizational units, the degree of in-
terdependence among the parts with respect to turning out a single product, 
the type of environment, and who is the principal beneficiary (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978). 
With the progress of differentiation and intégration of social structures 
facing the new challenges of their transforming environment there is more 
and more dominance of human life by complex organizations of a formaliz-
ed nature, and among them mainly by bureaucracies. In simple (primitive 
societies) the basis for social organization is provided by kinship; they do 
not hâve any clear-cut differentiated organizations. Work and leisure are 
not clearly delineated. The basic human needs of security and coordination 
of efforts hâve led in the long run to the establishment of artificial struc-
tures such as complex organizations (Durkheim, 1947). They are artifacts 
consciously established to serve certain purposes, with patterned internai 
relationships, and based on some more or less formulated 'rules of the 
game' (Silverman, 1970). They hâve their own rationality, namely that ail 
éléments of an organization should contribute to the success of the whole 
(Kotarbinski, 1965). In reality, the organization constitutes a negotiated 
order in which various groups bargain with one another; however, the com-
plex networks of groups which operate in complex organizations constitute 
the relatively permanent interaction Systems with spécifie boundaries and 
spécifie members (actors). 
There are various ways of viewing organizations depending on the 
perspective used. From the rational perspective organizations are a means 
of achieving certain social goals on the basis of a feeling of obligation (voca-
tion, duty) and with some constraints imposed upon employées in order to 
make them some kind of perfect instruments in working together. "There 
émerges an image of a highly efficient machine wherein a collection of ac-
tors are cooperatively engaged in a séries of behaviors that ail fit together 
into a grand scheme to accomplish a desired end.,, (Haas and Drabek, 
1973:27). From the natural System perspective organizations are viewed as 
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adaptive structures within a changing environment that must be coped with 
if equilibrium is to be maintained. If organizations are to survive they can-
not drift and adapt haphazardly to their environments without running a 
strong risk of developing segments with contradictory values and objec-
tives. From the human relations perspective the main issue in organizations 
is how to motivate people as individuals and as members of groups, as well 
as how to arrange their smooth coopération. Organizations are viewed from 
this perspective as sets of interlocked functioning groups (the linking pin 
principle). From the exchange perspective organizations are treated as sé-
quences of interactions and activities leading up to the décisions. The struc-
tural demands of the work situations must be related to the patterns of 
social relations, personality types of actors, and the exchanges of favors 
among them. Power in organizations may be gained by providing services 
desired by others who become dépendent on the supplier. From the conflict 
perspective organizations are viewed as fields of power redistributions bet-
ween various persons and groups. From the classicalperspective organiza-
tions constitute formai structures. The key to their success lies in the ar-
rangement of parts which taken together constitute an organization (Haas 
and Drabek, 1973:23-93). 
INTERNAL CONFLICTS OF THE HIERARCHICAL ORGANIZATIONS 
In the hierarchical organization the higher you ascend the more types 
of action are available to you; the lower you go the less freedom of action 
you enjoy, and the more your rôle is prescribed, limited in discrétion. 
Therefore, the cognitive and affective requirements of organizational 
leadership differ widely depending on the location of leader in the hierar-
chy. Thèse characteristic limits vary considerably the adaptational 
capabilities of the hierarchical organization, especially when it is necessary 
to face a changing and unpredictable environment. The lower rank leader is 
in great difficulty in task fulfillment as well as in giving the socio-emotional 
support to his subordinates as his discrétion is very limited. He seems 
unable to give promises and even more to keep them; he does not hâve the 
power to change things on the spot; he has to wait for décisions coming 
from the higher ranks. With the growing dependence of modem organiza-
tions on the dynamics of the external flexible environment this rigidity and 
inflexibility has become a more troublesome nuisance. On the other hand a 
far reaching flexibility and adaptability of the higher ranks also may create 
great organizational difficulties. 
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Because of the conflicting daims on available resources organizations 
are in reality "tension-management' ' entities (Moore). In order to lower the 
pressures, coming mainly from outside of the organization, the concept of a 
strict séparation of office and incumbent (in the sensé that the officiai does 
not own the "means of administration" and cannot appropriate the posi-
tion) was widely introduced. In bureaucracies a relation between legally in-
stated authorities and their subordinate officiais is characterized by defined 
rights and duties, prescribed in written régulations. This is typical for a 
bureaucracy. Organizations possess characteristics of the bureaucratie 
model in varying degrees along several dimensions of bureaucracy. There 
are the foliowing major bureaucratie characteristics: hierarchy of authority, 
division of labor, technically compétent participants, procédural devices for 
work situations, rules governing behavior of positional incumbents, limited 
authority of office, differential rewards by office, impersonality of personal 
contact, administration separated from ownership, emphasis on written 
communication, and rational discipline. 
However, the rigidification of any given institutional structure through 
standardization of procédures, far reaching specialization and limited flex-
ibility often leads to disruption or dissolution of society by way of internai 
upheaval or ineffectiveness against external change. Strain between human 
aspirations and passivity of the bureaucratie structure leads to nonformal 
behavior. There is the tendency in organizations among their constituent 
parts to resist actions which do not serve their own purposes (Selznick called 
it the problem of recalcitrance). There are problems of omission, distortion, 
and overload in transmission of messages within organizations. Each group 
within the bureaucratie organization attempts to préserve and enlarge its 
areas of discrétion, in order to limit its dependence on others, by making its 
behavior more unpredictable (Crozier, 1964). 
Lack of congruence in various fields of organization compliance leads 
to: lack of commitment among the organizational members, slowing of the 
socialization process, undermining of the managerial effectiveness, and a 
shaky authority. Bureaucracy is too rigid to adjust without crisis to the 
transformations that the accelerated évolution of industrial society makes 
more and more imperative. Among the dysfunctions of bureaucracy the 
most important factor is the displacement of values from the intrinsic quali-
ty of work to its by-products of income, security, prestige, and leisure 
(Presthus, 1978). Decentralization of décision making, an emphasis on 
mutual dependence and coopération based on trust, confidence, and high 
technical and professional compétence, pressure to enlarge tasks and inter-
relate them, decentralization of responsibility, commitment of participants 
~ ail of thèse are characteristics of organic organization free from the short-
comings of bureaucracy (Jaques, 1977). 
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DIFFICULTIES WITH PROBLEM-SOLVING 
The survival of complex organizations and their effectiveness dépends 
upon their ability to solve the basic problems which they face. According to 
Parsons, organizations in order to survive and develop, hâve to solve four 
basic problems: goal achievement, adaptation to the environment, intégra-
tion, and the maintenance of value patterns over time. Organizational effec-
tiveness manifests itself to the extent to which an organization, as a social 
system, fulfills its objectives without incapacitating its means and resources 
and without placing undue strain on its members (Georgopoulos and 
Tannenbaum, 1956). Organizational effectiveness involves the balanced 
emphasis upon achieving organizational objectives, problem-solving com-
pétence, and human energy utilization. 
The whole range of activities which a given organization Is able to 
develop in order to face the demands (organizational capability) is usually 
much higher than their actual utilization and the question is not so much 
how to maximize the organizational effectiveness as to do well enough to 
get by (satisfaction). 
In industrial organizations the overwhelming share of increased output 
should be attributed to technological factors. The state of the art of analyz-
ing the characteristics of raw materials is likely to détermine what kind of 
technology will be used. lt is the problem of understanding the material and 
of standardizing it. The central problem of mass production involves the 
need to administrate. The administrative demands may be so excessive that 
people are not able to meet them and there is a normative overload. 
The management of work teams in complex organizations very often 
meets its limits of perfection which are dictated by factors far beyond the 
control of a given manager. Theoretically, he should reconcile his respon-
sibility of initiating structures with the considération for the subordinates 
which contributes positively to higher work satisfaction, lower absenteeism 
and lower labor turnover. (There is a close relationship between 
absenteeism and supervisory behavior.) He should use démocratie-
persuasive skills and be flexible and open-minded. The more skilled his 
subordinates are the less direction he needs to give them. He should allow 
for some divergence of opinions in his team to inspire collective évaluation 
of current problems (créative groups produce better ideas if there is initial 
disagreement). In gênerai, he should help the members of his team to handle 
the tasks as well as to corne to terms with one another; group cohesiveness 
increases output when the work requires social motivation. Happy workers 
do not necessarily work harder, but a good team spirit contributes to the 
favorable organizational climate (Argyle, 1974). 
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF BUREAUCRACY 483 
In the reality of complex organizations the dependence of a team leader 
on higher échelons of authority introduces very serious limits in his ability 
to activate the group. It is a well known fact that in smaller organizational 
units job satisfaction tends to be greater, absenteeism, labor turnover, ac-
cidents, and labor disputes are less, in many cases by a large amount. 
However, the autonomization of small units is very often actively 
discouraged because it limits the power of higher authority levels. If work-
ing people are adequately informed about the results of their work then they 
can make their own performance more accurate, their motivation increases 
and they are more able to improve their own work. However, in reality the 
higher levels of authority do not hâve any vested interest in keeping the 
work teams adequately informed because this would create some problems. 
The experiments in autonomization of work teams quite often fail only 
because they never gained any sincère acceptance by the higher management 
levels vitally interested in keeping people subordinated to them as dispersed 
as possible. 
A rigid hierarchical organization may hâve a négative impact on its 
members by reinforcing in them those personality attributes which lead to 
submissiveness, lack of originality and initiative, inability to empathize, and 
low tolérance of any incongruities. It is a well known fact that offices oc-
cupied by people influence their attitudes (Lieberman, 1956) and it is even 
more valid to rôles played in cohesive groups. The intensification of control 
exercised by the complex organization in offices and formai groups, as this 
is typical for hierarchical organizations, may hâve far reaching consé-
quences for the mentality of people who are within the scope of organiza-
tional influence. The limitations of options open to the rôle occupants is 
one of the most important measures of organizational control and socializa-
tion. By rewarding some people with rôle discrétion and withdrawing it 
from others complex organizations introduce the factor of social inequality 
and sélective rewarding for loyalty without the necessity of appealing to 
coercion or to calculative rewarding. 
STRESS AND PARTICIPATION AS A REMEDY 
Modem complex organizations show a high level of sophistication in 
dealing with stresses. They alter the degree of stress by changes in either 
demands or capacity. They absorb new éléments into the leadership or 
policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting 
threats to its stability or existence (co-optation). The more successful firms 
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exhibit means of integrating (co-ordinating) their organizational units in a 
manner appropriate to their degree of differentiation (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). 
There are several ways to protect the throughput process from critical 
fluctuations in the environment: buffering, leveling, forecasting., and con-
trol. The choice of them dépends to a large extent on the nature of the en-
vironment. Emery has distinguished four levels of environments: placid, 
random (goals and noxiants distributed randomly and independently one 
from another); placid, cluster (goal and noxiants occur together with vary-
ing probabilities); disturbed, reactive (for example, the oligopolic market 
-the survival of a System dépends on its relation to other Systems); and tur-
bulent (dynamic processes arise from the field itself and create significant 
variances for the component Systems). With the growing environrnental un-
predictability it becomes more and more difficult for complex organizations 
to défend themselves against entropy, even if potentially social Systems are 
capable of the almost indefinite arresting of the entropie process (Katz and 
Kahn, 1978:123). 
In the highly developed économies there is a concentration of organiza-
tional power but at the same time there is also a lot of entropy because, 
among other things, of the overrationalization of organizational structures. 
A high degree of calculability is an important advantage of bureaucracy 
(Weber, 1968). Bureaucracy subordinates itself to anyone who is able to 
master the économie and légal techniques necessary for its proper function-
ing (Abrahamsson, 1977:62). Bureaucracy, and particularly state 
bureaucracy, is the médium through which the passage from the particular 
to the gênerai interest becomes possible (Mouzelis, 1967:8). However, at the 
same time bureaucracies - as was already mentioned ~ reduce human be-
ings to objects of manipulation. The hierarchical organizations are 
authority-bound and they constrict the drive of individuals towards maturi-
ty (Argyris, 1964). Various types of power in organizations are quite often 
in mutual disagreement.4 In supervision legitimate, expert and réfèrent 
4 According to French and Raven there are the following five basic types of power in 
organizations: reward power — the ability to reward another person in exchange for com-
pliance; coercive power — the ability to bring about an undesired state of affairs for another 
person in case of noncompliance; réfèrent power — compliance based on liking or identifica-
tion with a person because one admires the personal qualities and desires the other's respect; 
expert power — compliance based on the belief that another has greater technical knowledge or 
expertise and can be trusted to share the knowledge without distortion; and legitimate power — 
compliance which stems from a belief in the right of another person to direct activities and the 
belief that one has an obligation to comply. 
THE OBSOLESCENCE OF BUREAUCRACY 485 
power are primary acceptable grounds for eliciting compliance of subor-
dinates (Bachman et al., 1968). This compliance is a conséquence of the ex-
ercise of legitimate power supported by the means to reward and coerce 
subordinates, with control facilitated by expert and réfèrent power (Tausky, 
1978:139). Various types of power interfère with one another and this leads 
to several tensions. An organization itself is the outcome of the interaction 
of motivated people attempting to résolve their own problems. 
The question is how to motivate people but at the same time not to im-
pose too much authority on them. There are various methods of coordina-
tion called for by a particular technology and its interdependencies. 
Organization according to Thompson (1971) is a closed System (the 
technical core) operating within the protective boundaries of an open 
system. The syle of motivation and coordination should be a response to ail 
those éléments or features of an organization which impinge on employées 
to décide or limit the behavioral content of their work (Woodward, 1970). 
There are the following basic organizational constraints the supervision 
must deal with: technology, control Systems, product market, labor costs, 
and interest groups. There is a problem in modem complex organizations of 
leadership and power based on the control of scarce organizational 
resources. The nature of the personnel in the organization, its task, and the 
gênerai technological-environmental conditions appear to be the key déter-
minants of the form of leadership and power appropriate for various kinds 
of organizations. The distribution of control in most organizations is une-
qual. Those in power in an organization tend to remain in power. On the 
other hand, the power of those at the top of the organization becomes in-
creasingly limited with increased size of the organization. The degree of in-
tégration of élites and the number of resources at their disposai are a matter 
of dispute. Application of control limits freedom of subordinates as well as 
superiors. The social phenomenon of occupants of authority positions los-
ing interest in their personal acceptance by subordinates is generally related 
to progressing bureaucratization. In this respect it is worth mentioning as a 
significant fact that the largest proportion of managers in the U.S. hold 
downwardly anchored career perspectives (Tausky, 1978:155). 
There is still strong belief among the complex organization func-
tionaries that organizations are naturally authoritarian. "Who says 
organization, says oligarchy,, (Michels, 1915). This belief is historically 
founded in the authoritarian historical origins of complex organizations 
and on the attractiveness of the top positions in hierarchical structures. The 
fact that a working organization consists of conflicting claims on available 
resources and that it constitutes a network of groups that comprise a com-
plex bargaining system, also créâtes a demand for some arbitrary power. 
However, in reality "The final order which arises spontaneously is always 
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superior to that which human combination had by anticipation 
constructed" (Comte). Complex orgamzations neglecting the factor of 
spontaneity and following in their daily practice the machine theory neglect 
some very important sources of variability and unpredictability. The fact 
that so far within complex orgamzations vested interests of managers play a 
crucial rôle explains to a large extent the social origin of this omission. 
However, the crux of the problem is not so much in the managerial bias 
but in the situations structured in such a way that there is not much chance 
for alternative organizational solutions. It makes more sensé to talk about 
participative and autocratie situations than it does to talk about par-
ticipative and autocratie managers (Vroom, 1976:1545). Différences in pro-
ductivity which can be attributed to management are approximately only 15 
percent (Argyle et al., 1958; Mott, 1972). From the perspective of a con-
tingency theory it is necessary to accommodate alternative structural ar-
rangements, as well as to concern oneself with the degree and conséquences 
of uncertainty. 
The basic sociotechnical problem in this whole field is how to achieve 
an effective social intégration inside complex organizations that would 
counteract the négative effects of impersonalization and formalization. Dif-
ferentiation and intégration are two basic dimensions of organizations. Any 
formai System is bound to be slower than an informai one (Thiefenthal, 
1975). The distortion of information is built into the structure of organiza-
tions (Wilensky, 1967; Downs, 1967). 
The inability of complex organizations to produce harmony between 
individual characteristics and organizational demands has been widely 
critieized. For example, Abrahamsson (1977) critieized the Barnard-Simon-
March traditions from the perspective of organizations being utilized as a 
power resource and as a means for the domination of others. Various 
organizational participants are treated very differently and several of them 
are not really stakeholders (Rhenman, 1968) and this limits their commit-
ment. The réduction of working people to objects of manipulation, so évi-
dent in Taylorism, may lead under certain circumstances to higher produc-
tivity but in gênerai it leads to low employée morale. Some authors in the 
field take an even more sinter view, particularly on bureaucracy. According 
to Emery and Emery (1975) the bureaucratie system "is based on the built-
in high level redundancy of parts, and not on the multifunctional character 
of parts. The mass of people are parts who are rendered maximally redun-
dant and hence hâve to be minimally relied upon or trusted for their perfor-
mance. Assymetry, egocentrism and the différence in status define com-
munication, and the 'shadow society' in the background becomes a necessi-
ty. Messages either inform or instruct, but they do not enlighten" (Emery 
and Emery, 1975). 
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There is a question of under which conditions people working in com-
plex organizations are willing and able to be productive and satisfied. Ac-
cording to the expectancy theory, people will be motivated to be highly pro-
ductive if they feel they can be highly productive and if they see a number of 
positive outcomes associated with being a high producer. The perception of 
the situation is very important (Lawler, 1973:52). Level of pay and job 
security are of widespread concern among employées. Pay has at least the 
same value as an inducement in jobs choice among the blue collar workers 
as challenging jobs (Tausky, 1978:59). The attitude of people towards their 
work dépends, among other things, on their location in the division of 
labor. Job orientation is much more common among white collar workers 
than among blue collar workers (Dubin et al., 1975). The white collar 
workers are not satisfied with increased income and a large proportion of 
them are tolérant of tension on the job if that is the price of career progres-
sion. Job satisfaction is directly related to the amount of pay received, the 
amount of considération that people report they receive from their super-
visors, the belief they hâve in chances of promotion, and their chances of 
being in a stable workgroup, having a varied task and control over their 
place at work. There is not a direct relationship between job satisfaction 
and productivity. Disparity between aspiration and achievement is the basic 
source of dissatisfaction among organizational members. The worker is 
psychologically alienated at work only when he brings into it certain expec-
tations and ends which are not satisfying. The satisfaction of organizational 
members grows with the position in the hierarchy of power and prestige. 
The organizational involvement of subordinates dépends, among other 
things, on the potential of their supervisors to exercise power. By 
stimulating the satisfaction of subordinates their superiors may raise the 
gênerai level of loyalty, morale, and mutual understanding. People who 
work under strict control lose initiative and eagerness to produce more. 
Changes based on the active participation of people are relatively dif-
ficult to achieve. In highly cohesive groups, group standards are effectively 
used to produce at a rate which is either higher or lower than among groups 
with low cohésion (Seashore). Organizations in which décision making is 
shared widely throughout the structure with well-integrated linking pro-
cesses provided by overlapping groups will be more productive than 
organizations in which most décisions are made at upper levels. 
In order to achieve a satisfactory organizational intégration it is 
necessary to take into considération the adequacy of the given pattern of in-
tégration for the achieved state of differentiation, the degree to which com-
mon values exist between integrators (leaders, administrators, etc.) and peo-
ple who are objects of intégration, and the effectiveness of the particular in-
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tegrative pattern in dealing with social disturbances. For example, an 
organization is more likely to be strongly centralized during external crises 
than during the normal period. A mechanistic organization is likely to occur 
when the task activity is répétitive. Younger workers express less work 
satisfaction than older workers. People who are higher in the organizational 
hierarchy express stronger feelings of responsibility. Discontent with 
routinized highly répétitive tasks is relatively common among employées. 
In modem times there is a growing tendency to promote job reform as 
job enrichment rather than job enlargement. Job enrichment means a ver-
tical expansion of an employee's job requiring an increase in the skills réper-
toire, while job enlargement means a horizontal expansion of an employee's 
job, giving him more of the same kind of activities but not altering the 
necessary skills (Herzberg). Teamwork is experimented with on a large scale 
particularly in Scandinavia. The results are not always encouraging but on 
the other hand there is also no empirical évidence that employée participa-
tion correlates with low efficiency, low profits and inadéquate investment. 
A great deal dépends on the forms in which the employée participation is 
practiced. "Not only is it physically impossible to make numerous décisions 
in some sort of mass-meeting or plébiscite format, but managers and 
employées alike will ordinarily not wish to trade time for participation in 
unnecessary meetings - unnecessary in the sensé that the preferred décision 
would occur without the need for participation by the individual involved". 
(Garson, 1975:32). 
The introduction of participatory schemes in complex organizations 
does not necessarily lead to higher satisfaction of the organizational 
members. Participation works best when people are used to it. The sharing 
of some common goals among involved parties is basic for an effective par-
ticipation (Thiefenthal, 1975). A formai participation plan is welcomed to 
the extent that it has positive conséquences for job security, pay, benefits 
and other conditions of work (Tausky, 1978:128). 
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L'obsolescence des bureaucraties 
En général, les individus perçoivent les organisations comme un ensemble de 
contraintes. On y observe une crise de l'autorité en tant que pouvoir légitime, qui 
pousse leurs membres à se comporter selon la volonté de ceux qui occupent les posi-
tions importantes à l'intérieur de l'organisation. Les divers types d'autorité qui se 
fondent sur le droit, la position, la compétence, l'attraction sociale ou la personnali-
té, bien souvent ne se renforcent pas les unes les autres. Dans ces circonstances, le 
dilemme de la direction désireuse d'assurer une coordination efficace de l'activité du 
personnel devient très critique. L'établissement d'un rapport optimal entre des inté-
rêts techniques, sociaux et économiques, qui s'opposent souvent, apparaît comme 
une tâche extrêmement délicate. 
Aussi, la prévision et la compréhension d'un événement ainsi que le degré de 
programmation anticipée qui met en lumière les réponses appropriées conformes à 
des exigences pressantes sont d'une importance capitale pour les organisations lors-
que celles-ci ont à traiter de cas urgents. On peut faire face à ces cas urgents, en met-
tant au point des mécanismes variés d'adaptation, y compris l'esprit d'organisation. 
Et la nécessité de l'esprit d'organisation s'accroît suivant la progression de la division 
du travail. 
On note de forts éléments collectivistes dans les organisations bureaucratiques 
modernes qui déploient plusieurs techniques de manipulation afin de rendre leurs 
membres sujets d'obligations d'abord, puis ensuite seulement de droits. Toutefois, la 
différenciation socio-culturelle plus grande qui existe dans les sociétés modernes 
contre-balance cette tendance. Quand des groupes au sein d'une organisation ressen-
tent la nécessité d'être fortement différenciés, mais requièrent aussi d'être rigoureu-
sement intégrés, il est nécessaire pour l'organisation de développer des mécanismes 
d'intégration plus compliqués. Les mécanismes d'identification sont très forts con-
sidérés globalement (la consommation de masse), mais ils ont beaucoup moins d'in-
fluence sur les individus et les petits groupes. Même dans les pays totalitaires, l'effi-
cacité de ces mécanismes paraît plutôt douteuse. 
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Dans les organisations traditionnelles, la structure sociale était dominante, rela-
tivement stable et fondée sur la coutume, tandis que dans les organisations moder-
nes, la techno-structure, la structure administrative et la structure sociale sont relati-
vement indépendantes les unes des autres, suivent leur propre cheminement dynami-
que et interfèrent. La fonction de coordination s'accroît, mais, dans une grande 
mesure, elle est coupée des structures énumérées ci-dessus et sa valeur est de nature 
purement rationnelle. Très souvent, cette rationalité engendre le doute ou même une 
mauvaise utilisation lorsqu'il lui faut relever un défi qui dépasse de beaucoup la com-
pétence de la direction. C'est à ce moment qu'une crise d'autorité peut saper la stabi-
lité de l'organisation et entraîner une division entre les diverses structures. 
La loyauté envers l'organisation est alors exposée à des dangers même si des 
hommes dévoués (organization men) s'efforcent de maîtriser leurs désaccords en ma-
tière de savoir en s'impliquant à fond dans leur organisation. La caractérisation d'un 
rôle dans les organisations modernes n'est probablement fondée que d'une façon 
marginale sur l'engagement envers les organisations, mais elle tient à des engage-
ments d'un type différent qui est souvent en état de conflit avec l'idéologie apparente 
des organisations. Tensions, rivalités, hostilités mêmes sont des facteurs d'importan-
ce majeure. Comme le déclarent Katz et Kahn, en se fondant sur des données empiri-
ques, «l'expérience de situations de conflit en milieu de travail est généralisée». Sui-
vant les estimations américaines, la moitié des employés travaillent en conditions de 
conflits notables et d'un dixième à un tiers d'entre eux font l'expérience à un degré 
substantiel d'un rôle ambigu.À mesure que l'organisation grandit, il y a davantage 
de conflits, de retards, de maladies et de roulement de main-d'oeuvre. Dans les gran-
des organisations, il y a même anomie; l'acceptation du rôle qu'on y joue est dimi-
nuée; il y a plus de différentiation et, en même temps, il devient plus difficile d'hu-
maniser l'ambiance au sein de l'organisation en la ramenant à quelques dimensions 
individuelles discernables. La contrainte totale est principalement accentuée dans les 
postes marginaux qui sont exposés à des pressions et à des prévisions qui se contredi-
sent. 
La disparité entre les ambitions et leur réalisation est une des sources principales 
du défaut d'adaptation. Les organisations caractérisées par des rapports tendus tant 
au plan vertical qu'horizontal peuvent changer plus facilement que celles dont les cli-
vages sont plus marqués. La continuité et le changement dans les structures de per-
formance varient en fonction des types de contraintes et de résistance parmi et à l'in-
térieur des structures de normes, de rapports humains et de ressources disponibles. 
Les incompatibilités et les oppositions apparaissent à la fois à l'intérieur des réseaux 
de systèmes et entre eux. 
Avec la croissance du secteur public, les perspectives de tension dans les organi-
sations complexes deviennent de plus en plus importantes qu'auparavant. L'idée de 
gouvernement considéré comme une institution de service qui ne doit pas être sujette 
à préemption par l'un quelconque des individus et des groupes qui combattent dans 
l'arène politique est mise en danger par des droits acquis derrière lesquels on se 
retranche. Les administrateurs ont tendance à développer des droits acquis sur les 
terrains ou dans les activités sur lesquels ils exercent leur compétence et leur autorité 
en observant le moins possible les règles formelles, parfois même en y passant outre. 
La croissance sans restriction de l'administration publique peut mettre en danger le 
rôle de la loi et la séparation des pouvoirs. Afin de se défendre de toutes les accusa-
tions possibles, la bureaucratie a pour stratégie de s'en tenir à la lettre de la loi. 
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Les organisations envisagées ici comme relativement complexes et comme des 
systèmes d'interaction relativement permanents aux frontières et aux acteurs spécifi-
ques diffèrent dans leurs cultures respectives, c'est-à-dire que celles-ci ont un profil 
distinct formé de normes, de valeurs, de convictions, de façons de se comporter etc., 
qui caractérisent la manière selon laquelle les groupes et les individus s'allient dans 
l'accomplissement de leurs tâches. Dans les bureaucraties, la culture composante est 
en grande partie dictée par l'organisation formelle, entendue ici comme «une struc-
ture consciemment conçue s'adaptant aux conditions internes et externes, appuyés 
sur des activités de contrôle mises en place pour guider et régulariser la correspon-
dance entre les activités réelles et les activités projetées». Ceci est relié dans une large 
mesure au volume de croissance de l'organisation. Les grandes organisations ont ten-
dance à être plus spécialisées, plus standardisées et plus formalistes que des organisa-
tions plus petites. Les plus grandes organisations se trouvent dans le secteur public et 
leur personnel est formé de fonctionnaires, c'est-à-dire d'un corps d'administrateurs 
institué selon des procédures bien établies en matière de sélection, de formation, 
d'évaluation, de rémunération, de discipline et de mise à pied. 
Les phénomènes au sein des organisations complexes doivent être situés à l'inté-
rieur même des frontières de l'organisation qui inclut des secteurs d'activité qui, au 
point de vue social, sont reconnus comme étant les limites de la compétence de l'or-
ganisation et sur laquelle elle a autorité. Le plus important de ces phénomènes est le 
pouvoir avec ses attributs fondamentaux de récompenses, de coercition, de soumis-
sion personnelle, de compétence et de légalité. Le pouvoir coercitif apparaît dans ses 
formes extrêmes dans les organisations totalitaires complexes. Toutefois, sous quel-
que régime que ce soit, le pouvoir joue un rôle majeur dans toutes les situations où le 
contrôle de ressources peu abondantes est une nécessité. Les fonctions et les dysfonc-
tions des rapports de pouvoir sont un des principaux objets de l'analyse sociologique 
qui essaie d'expliquer comment les systèmes sociaux réagiront aux forces de change-
ment en s'y adaptant, pourquoi l'ordre social se maintient malgré les pressions inter-
nes et externes qui poussent au changement, quelles sont les situations et les causes de 
conflits aussi bien que d'équilibre relatif, comment les systèmes disposent leurs con-
ditions internes et leur développement pour convenir aux exigences externes, com-
ment le processus de sélectivité répond au changement ambiant de fonctions. Il est 
d'importance primordiale de ce point de vue d'étudier comment les organisations 
complexes parviennent à un état qui inclut l'acceptation de l'autorité légitime et la 
soumission à ses exigences, soumission qui, pour bien des gens, s'étend à des actes 
qu'ils ne comprennent pas et qui peuvent violenter leurs propres valeurs. Le concept 
des types idéaux est particulièrement utile dans tout ce qui vient d'être cité. 
L'élaboration d'un «type idéal» comme outil d'analyse sera d'autant plus abs-
trait qu'il aura été conçu de façon précise et exacte. C'est ainsi qu'il sera mieux en 
mesure de remplir son rôle qui consistera dans la formulation d'une terminologie, 
dans l'élaboration de classification et d'hypothèses. 
